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Abstract
We model public-private partnerships in building and managing facilities
for the provision of public services. In particular, we analyze both the desir-
ability of bundling the building and management operations, and the optimal
allocation of ownership between the public sector and private …rms. When
a positive externality exists across stages of production, bundling is always
optimal; but unbundling tends to be preferred when the externality is nega-
tive. Whether public ownership is preferred to private ownership depends on
the extent of the externality, the market value of the facility and the e¤ect
of the …rms’ investments on social bene…ts.
JEL Classi…cation: H11
Keywords: public-private partnership, integration versus separation and
incomplete contracts
11 Introduction
The provision of many public services is organized through contracting out by
the government of some infrastructure functions to private pro…t-maximizing
…rms. Under traditional procurement, the public sector …nances and designs
the project itself, contracts with a private …rm to build the facility, and then
either operates the facility in-house or contracts out the operation to an-
other …rm (HM Treasury, 1998). Recently, however, governments in Western
Europe and North America have developed new forms of public-private part-
nership for public service provision (Rosenau, 2000). In particular, in the
UK, it has become common, under the Private Finance Initiative (PFI), to
contract out the design, building, …nance and operation of an infrastructure
project to a consortium of …rms (Grout, 1997; HM Treasury, 2000). The
formation of a consortium may allow the exploitation of synergies between
the di¤erent phases of a project, inducing more innovative and cost-e¤ective
designs (Daniels and Trebilcock, 2000; IPPR, 2001).
In this paper we study the desirability of the PFI model and the (second-
best) optimal allocation of ownership between the government and the …rms
with which it contracts. We consider a stylized setting in which there are two
stages to a project: the ‘building’ of a facility and then the ‘management’ of
2public service provision.1 The government delegates these two functions to
private …rms. Because the functions require specialized skills, two distinct
…rms carry out the tasks. We analyze whether it is optimal for the govern-
ment to contract with the two …rms separately (‘unbundling’) or whether
it is preferable for the government to write a single contract with a consor-
tium of the two …rms (‘bundling’). We also analyze the optimal allocation
of ownership of the facility. We assume that, due to contractual incomplete-
ness, ownership rights result in control rights: the owner of the facility has
the power to decide (and veto) whether any given innovative activity can be
implemented.2
We show that a critical role is played by externalities across the di¤erent
stages of production. In particular, in the presence of a positive external-
1Thus, we disregard entirely the source of …nance for the project. However, as we
are focusing on the potential synergies between the building and management stages, the
source of …nance may not be a signi…cant factor. See Sussex (2001) for discussion of how
the private …nance element might be excluded from PFI in the health sector.
2Other applications of the theory of incomplete contracts to the contracting out of
public services include Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Besley and Ghatak (2001).
Hart et al. consider the scope for con‡ict between cost reduction and quality improvement
when there is a single private …rm. They compare contracting out with in-house provision.
Besley and Ghatak show that the ownership of a public good should lie with the party
that values its services more highly, irrespective of the relative importance of the parties’
investments. However, neither of these papers deals with the issue of bundling and owner-
ship. A recent contribution to the literature on PFI by Bentz, Grout and Halonen (2001)
is complementary to the incomplete contract approach, emphasizing the informational and
contractual nature of the problem. An implication of their model is that the government
will wish to buy services (as in PFI) rather than assets (as in conventional procurement)
if the building and service delivery costs are low.
3ity, bundling is always optimal, for it allows internalization of the positive
e¤ect that the investment activities in the building stage generate on the
management of the facility. Hence, the formation of consortia is preferred to
contracting with separate …rms. Whether the ownership of the facility should
be with the consortium, as in PFI, or the government, is shown to depend
on the market value of the asset, the extent of the externality across stages
and the social bene…ts generated by the asset. Ownership by the consortium
induces its members to internalize more of the e¤ect of their choices on both
the residual value of the asset and the externality across the stages, but less
of the e¤ect on social bene…ts. Hence, depending on the relative signi…cance
of these e¤ects in the welfare function, either consortium ownership or pub-
lic ownership can be optimal. These results also hold in the absence of an
externality.
The case of negative externality can lead to quite di¤erent results. In
particular, unbundling may become optimal, making consortia undesirable.
This result can be understood by noticing that in a world where contracts are
incomplete, the hold-up problem may lead to underinvestment even under
the preferred ownership structure. To attenuate the underinvestment prob-
lem, it may become optimal to induce the …rms not to internalize a negative
4externality since this could depress incentives further. Thus, it may be opti-
mal either to give ownership rights to the …rm involved only in the building
stage or, provided the two …rms act independently, to the government.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model.
Section 3 discusses the case of positive externalities between the di¤erent
phases of production and compares di¤erent ownership structures; it also
covers the case of no externalities. Section 4 studies the negative externality
case, while Section 5 concludes and draws some policy implications.
2 The Model
We consider a setting where the government delegates to private …rms the
building and management of a facility (or ‘asset’) which is used to supply
a public service. To take into account the possibility that each stage of
production requires specialized skills, we allow for the existence of two private
…rms: …rm 1 is specialized in building, while …rm 2 manages the facility
once it is built. The building and management functions will be said to be
‘bundled’ if the two …rms form a consortium and operate as a single unit.
The functions are ‘unbundled’ if the two …rms operate independently and the
5government contracts separately with each of them.
At the beginning of each stage of the project, building and management,
the …rm concerned may make an observable but unveri…able investment, re-
searching innovative approaches to performing its task. Let a denote the
level (and cost) of investment made by …rm 1 at the beginning of the build-
ing stage and let e denote the level (and cost) of investment made by …rm
2 at the beginning of the management stage (a;e ¸ 0). We assume that
each of these innovations, if implemented, a¤ects both the residual value of
the asset and the social bene…t that is generated by the production of the
public service once the facility is built and run. Neither innovation can be
contracted upon ex ante, for it is not possible to specify in advance the de-
livery of a speci…c innovation. However, this uncertainty is resolved after
the investment in research is made and any renegotiation occurs. We shall
assume that parties are risk-neutral and have rational expectations about the
renegotiation process when they make their investments, that is, they can
make correct calculations about the expected returns from any action. All
variables may be interpreted in expected terms and discounted appropriately.
6The residual value of the asset is given by3
R
i(a;e) = µ
i[R0 + t(a) + r(e)], i = G;F,
where R0 is a positive constant, t0(a);r0(e) > 0 and t00(a);r00(e) · 0: a may be
interpreted as an investment devoted to improving the quality of the building,
say by developing ways of using recently available resistant materials; e may
be interpreted as an investment in asset-maintenance activities.
The parameter µ
i is used to allow for the possibility that, when the man-
agement stage is over (at the end of the period of service provision speci…ed
in the contract) the residual value of the asset will depend on the use to
which it is put. The residual value that the government assigns to the asset,
linked to the possibility of continuing to use it for the provision of the public
service, is RG(a;e): If, instead, the asset is used by private …rms in the post-
contractual period, its (market) value is RF(a;e): We assume that µ
G ¸ µ
F,
so that RG(a;e) > RF(a;e).4 This assumption is justi…ed on the grounds
3The innovations fa;eg only a¤ect Ri if they are implemented. However, in our so-
lutions they actually are implemented and so, for simplicity, we write Ri as a function
of fa;eg. A similar comment applies to the bene…t function and the externality in the
management cost function speci…ed below.
4A setting in which the reverse inequality may hold is considered by Edlin and Hermalin
(2000).
7that most of the facilities that are built in order to provide public services
would need some restructuring in order to be valuable for the provision of
alternative services. Consider the case of a prison. It would be costly to
the private sector to convert the prison into a hotel and, given restrictions
on prison location, it could be expensive to the government to move the ac-
commodation of the inmates elsewhere. We further assume that Ri (a;e) is
observable but not veri…able.5
The social bene…ts generated by the facility at the management stage are
B (a;e) = B0 + v(e) + u(a)
where B0 is a positive constant, v0(e);u0(a) > 0 and v00(e); u00(a) · 0:
Note that both e and a a¤ect social bene…ts positively: an increase in the
quality of the asset or in maintenance activities increases the bene…ts from
the provision of the service (a well-constructed or well-maintained prison may
facilitate the rehabilitation of inmates).
5The unveri…ability of asset values implies that no pro…t-sharing contract can be
enforced.
8The costs at the building stage are
K (a) = K0 + a
where K0 is a positive constant.6 However, we also allow for the possibility
that the investment undertaken during the building stage a¤ects the cost of
managing the facility, which is
C (a;e) = C0 + c(a) + e (1)
where C0 is a positive constant. We consider two cases. First, c0(a) · 0 and
c00(a) · 0; that is, there exists a positive (or zero) externality between stages.
This occurs, for example, when an improvement in the building quality brings
about a reduction in maintenance activities. In the second case, c0(a) > 0
and c00(a) ¸ 0; that is, there exists a negative externality across stages. This
may be representative of a situation where a higher quality of the building
requires greater maintenance costs.
6We follow Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) in assuming that after a …rm has incurred
an investment cost in researching an innovation (a in our case) there is no additional cost
in implementing the innovation. Our broad conclusions would survive if we dropped this
assumption. The same comment applies to the investment e. See Besley and Ghatak
(2001) for a model in which implementation costs play a role.
9We assume that B (¢); C (¢) and K (¢) are observable but unveri…able.
The allocation of property rights on the asset therefore has a twofold e¤ect.
First, it a¤ects the allocation of control rights, for it is assumed that the
implementation of any innovation requires the owner’s approval. Second, the
allocation of property rights may determine whether or not the asset will be
sold once the contract expires.7 Indeed, allowing for di¤erent asset values,
depending on the use of the asset, implies that if the owner is not the one
who values the asset most, then sale will occur.
Each private …rm is assumed to maximize its pro…ts, including value
generated at the end of the contract by its asset ownership, if any. The
government maximizes the social bene…ts B(¢) net of the payments to the
…rms, including the residual value of the asset if it is, or will be, the owner.
In this setting, the …rst-best levels of investments (e¤;a¤)maximize B(a;e)+














¤) = 1 (3)
7In practice, however, as noted by the National Audit O¢ce (2001), it is sometimes
found that a government department prevents a private contractor (the owner of the
asset) from implementing an innovative design. In e¤ect, this results in a hybrid form of
ownership not considered in this paper.
10We assume that e¤ > 0 and a¤ > 0.
The timing of the game can be summarized as follows. In period 0, the
ownership structure is chosen and the government speci…es basic standards
that must be met in the design of the facility and the provision of the service.
These basic standards are observable and veri…able. Also, the price P that
the government will pay to …rm 1 for building the facility to the basic stan-
dard and the price p that it will pay to …rm 2 for providing the service at the
basic standard are speci…ed. At the beginning of the building stage (period
1), …rm 1 can undertake research to improve upon the contracted design of
the facility. Conditional upon the approval of the owner, renegotiation of
contract terms may take place to allow the innovation to be incorporated in
the building of the facility. Similarly, at the beginning of the management
stage (period 2), research can be carried out by …rm 2 to …nd ways to improve
upon the contracted level of service. Again, renegotiation of contract terms
may take place to allow the innovation to be implemented in the supply of
the service. When period 2 ends, the contractual relationship between the
…rms and the government ends. In period 3 the owner of the facility can
freely decide on its future use.8
8Although what we call period 3 may, in practice, occur tens of years after the ini-
tiation of the project, there is evidence, that, even allowing for appropriate discounting,
11We start by discussing four alternative ownership structures for the facil-
ity.9 The …rst three involve private ownership: by …rm 1, by …rm 2 and by a
consortium (…rms 1 and 2 being integrated). We shall refer to ownership by
the consortium as PFI. The fourth type of ownership is by the government.
This divides into two cases: the two …rms may be operating separately or
they may be organized as a consortium. We compare these ownership struc-
tures in the presence, …rst, of a positive externality, and then of a negative
externality.
3 Positive Externality
Assume that c0(a) · 0 and c00(a) · 0. Hence, (implementation of) a greater
investment a at the building stage leads to a fall (or no change) in the cost
of providing the service at the management stage.
Throughout, we use subscripts on fa;eg to denote values taken under a
particular ownership structure (e.g., a2 is the value of a when …rm 2 owns
residual value often plays a critical role. For example, the contractor Jarvis has stated
that its return on PFIs in building and maintaining schools is high primarily because of
the (expected) residual value (Financial Times, 13.9.00). Similarly, see Financial Times,
1.3.00, on the role of residual value in the building of a community centre in Dudley, West
Midlands.
9Throughout, when we refer to the ‘optimal’ ownership structure, we mean the one,






F; at the end of period 2 the asset has a (weakly) greater value
for the government than for the private market. We therefore assume that if
a private …rm owns the asset it will negotiate with the government. We see
no reason to suppose that one party has all the bargaining power, and so we
assume they will split the gains from trade equally.10 This implies that the














[R0 + t(a) + r(e)], (4)



















[R0 + t(a) + r(e)].
(5)
10Indeed, option-to-buy contracts like those suggested by Nöldeke and Schmidt (1998)
are not robust to renegotiation.
133.1.1 Ownership to Firm 1
Suppose that …rm 1 owns the facility.11 Consider the building stage. Since







t(a) + r(e)] from the sale of the asset to the government, it will implement
the innovation. Let s1 denote the side-payment …rm 1 will have to make to
…rm 2 to induce …rm 2 to implement its innovation e.12 Pro…t-maximization
by …rm 1 therefore entails
max







[R0 + r(e) + t(a)] ¡ s1,








0(a1) = 1. (6)
Compared to the …rst-best, under-investment occurs for three reasons: the










G); and it does not take into account the
11In our framework the case of ownership to …rm 1 is equivalent to the case of joint
ownership between the government and …rm 1 if we view the partners in a joint venture
as each having veto power.
12We shall see below that s1 is independent of a. It therefore does not a¤ect …rm 1’s
f.o.c. for pro…t maximization.
14e¤ect of a on either social bene…ts B(a;e) or …rm 2’s costs C (a;e):
Now consider the management stage. Since ownership of the asset is in the
hands of …rm 1, …rm 2 cannot implement the management innovation without
the approval of …rm 1. It follows that the default payo¤ of …rm 2 in this case
is p ¡ C (a1;e). However, since there are gains from the implementation
of the innovation (indeed the implementation of e has a positive e¤ect on
the payo¤ of …rm 1, for it increases the residual value of the asset) it is
reasonable to expect the …rms to realize them through negotiation. We shall







r(e), the e¤ect of the innovation e on the part of the
residual value accruing to the …rm 1. Hence, …rm 1 makes …rm 2 the side






r(e), the pro…t-maximization problem for …rm 2
being
max








Given (1), it follows that at the beginning of period 2, …rm 2 will choose the








0(e1) = 1. (7)
Under-investment occurs since the …rm does not fully internalize the e¤ect of
e on the residual value, nor does it take into account the e¤ect on the social
bene…ts B(a;e):
3.1.2 Ownership to Firm 2
When …rm2 owns the facility, …rm1 has no incentive to implement innovation
a. However, …rm 2 wishes the innovation to be implemented, for it increases
the future value of the asset and reduces the costs of operating the facility.
We therefore assume that the two …rms will negotiate and agree to share
the bene…ts from the innovation equally. It follows that …rm 1 solves the
problem,
max











Here, [:] is the e¤ect of the innovation a on the part of the residual value
accruing to …rm 2, together with the externality that a has on …rm 2’s cost.
16Because of Nash bargaining with …rm 2, …rm 1 gets half of these bene…ts;
that is, it receives from …rm 2 the side-payment s2 = 1
2[:]. Hence, …rm 1 sets












0 (a2) = 1. (8)
Firm 2 foresees gains from the sale of the asset to the government and so








0(e2) = 1 (9)
3.1.3 Ownership to Consortium (PFI)
Suppose now that the two …rms operate as a consortium, which owns the
facility. Since the consortium has control power as well as residual claimancy
over the asset value, it will implement both the building and management
innovation. The consortium acts as an integrated …rm and so its pro…t-
maximization problem is
max


























0(eI) = 1 (11)
Comparison of (10) and (11) with (2) and (3) reveals that, as in the
ownership cases above, under-investment occurs.
3.2 Public Ownership
Suppose now that the government has control rights over the asset. Inno-
vations cannot be implemented without the government’s agreement. Thus,
unlike in PFI, the government has a say on input speci…cations. A …rm will
not implement an innovation unless it has negotiated adequate rewards from
the government. However, with regard to the building stage, we shall see
that the choice of the level of a depends crucially on whether the two …rms
are integrated.
183.2.1 Firms in a Consortium
Assume …rst that the two …rms are in a consortium. Since there are positive
bene…ts for the government from the implementation of the innovation, both
in terms of social bene…ts and in terms of higher residual value, it follows
that Nash bargaining occurs. The consortium therefore faces the pro…t-
maximization problem,13
max




G[R0 + r(e) + t(a)] + v(e) + u(a)g:





















Note that under-investment still occurs. Although in this case the …rm
takes into account the e¤ect of its investments on both the residual value
13p+P ¡(K0+a)¡(C0+e) here is the integrated …rm’s default payo¤ (the costs fa;eg
having been incurred, but the innovations not being implemented). The remaining term
is the …rm’s share of the surplus from implementation of fa;eg.
19and social bene…ts, it does so only partially, for the gains must be split with
the government. Also, note that because the …rm is integrated, it takes into
account the externality across stages.
3.2.2 Separated Firms
As in the case where the two …rms are integrated in a consortium, Nash bar-
gaining occurs, for the government wishes the innovation to be implemented.
However, now the government contracts with the two …rms separately. It
follows that in the Nash bargain between …rm 1 and the government the ex-
ternality across the building and management stages will not be taken into
account. Firm 1 decides on the investment cost a, taking into account that
it will share the bargaining surplus u(a)+µ
Gt(a) with the government. Sim-
ilarly, for …rm 2 the cost is e and the surplus v(e)+µ
Gr(e) is bargained over.



















From (13) and (15), separation has no e¤ect on the choice of e: eGI = eGS.
20However, from (12) and (14) it does a¤ect the choice of a. When …rms are
separate, neither the government nor …rm 1 is interested in the e¤ect of a on
the cost of managing the facility.
3.3 Optimal Ownership and Task Allocation
We can now compare the ownership arrangements in terms of fa;eg. First we
ascertain whether it is optimal to bundle building and management. Since
all ownership structures lead to underinvestment compared to the …rst-best,
while, from (6)-(15), aI > a1;a2; eI = e2 > e1; aGI > aGS; eGI = eGS, we
obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1 With a positive (or zero) externality, bundling of building
and management is always optimal.
If ownership is private, then the PFI model of ownership by the consor-
tium always dominates ownership by either …rm 1 or …rm 2. If ownership is
public, it is always better for the government to contract with a consortium
than with separate …rms. Intuition follows from the fact that in all owner-
ship structures there exists an underinvestment problem. Consequently, it is
always optimal to induce the internalization of the positive externality across
stages of production, and this calls for bundling of building and management.
21Given this proposition, the choice of the optimal ownership structure
reduces to the choice between ownership to the government, which contracts
with a consortium, and ownership to the consortium (PFI). The lemma below
is obtained by comparing the …rst-order conditions for the choices of a and
e:14
Lemma 1 With a positive externality, (i) if u0(a) < (>) µ
Ft0(a) ¡ c0(a)
investment a is higher (lower) under PFI than under public ownership; (ii)
if v0(e) < (>) µ
Fr0(e) investment e is higher (lower) under PFI than under
public ownership.
The next proposition follows immediately.
Proposition 2 With a positive externality, if u0(a) < µ
Ft0(a) ¡ c0(a) and
v0(e) < µ
Fr0(e), PFI is optimal; but if both inequalities are reversed, public
ownership is optimal.
Intuitively, when the consortium owns the facility it would implement
both innovations since it foresees gains from the eventual sale of the facility
to the government and from the future reduction of operating costs. Thus,
14For simplicity, we consider only the possibility of strong inequalities in this lemma and
in the rest of the paper.
22it internalizes partially the e¤ect of e and a on R (recall that it must share
residual value with the government - see eq. (5)) and it internalizes totally
the positive externality on costs, though will not take into account the e¤ects
of its choices on B.
When the government owns the facility, however, the consortium cannot
implement the innovation in the event of disagreement, and so renegotiation
between the consortium and the government takes place. As a result of Nash
bargaining, the consortium will share the bene…ts from the innovation with
the government, and it will get less of the asset value than it would if it
were the owner. In particular, it loses half of the e¤ects of the innovation on
private residual value and half of the positive externality, while it gains half
of the e¤ects on social bene…t: Hence, although it now partially internalizes
the e¤ect on social bene…t, it also only partially internalizes the e¤ect on
the residual value and the positive externality. Therefore, if the e¤ect of the
building innovation on social bene…t dominates that on the private residual
value and the cost of operating the facility; public ownership leads to higher
investment in the building stage. It will also lead to a greater investment in
the management stage if the e¤ect of the management innovation on the so-
cial bene…t dominates that on the private residual value: This is a case where
23absence of ownership for the …rm works as a commitment to renegotiate, and
renegotiation is optimal.
Instead, if the e¤ect of the building innovation on social bene…t is domi-
nated by that on the private residual value and on the cost of operating the
facility; then consortium ownership is preferable for both e and a.
In the remaining cases, where for one innovation the e¤ects on the residual
value and the cost of managing the facility dominate, while for the other it is
the social bene…t e¤ect that is greater, each of the two ownership structures
will encourage one type of investment but depress the other. Hence, it is the
relative importance of the two investments in the welfare function that will
be critical in determining which ownership structure is optimal.
4 Negative Externality
We now consider the case where c0(a) > 0 and c00(a) ¸ 0. This may be
representative of a situation where higher quality of the building requires
greater maintenance costs, or where a path-breaking design may have a high
risk of breakdown. Another interpretation is that the facility may be designed
such that highly skilled, expensive labour is required to manage provision of
24the service.15 Note that the equilibrium choices of the …rms remain the same
as in the previous section provided that they are interior, as we assume for
simplicity. However, di¤erent conclusions than in the previous section tend
to emerge as to the optimality of the di¤erent ownership structures.
The sign of the externality has no implications for the choice of e: we still
have that eI = e2 > e1 and eGI = eGS. However, with respect to a, it may
not now be optimal to induce the internalization of the externality. From (6),
(8) and (10), we now have that a1 > aI and a1 > a2, while from (12) and
(14), aGS > aGI. The following lemma therefore holds.
Lemma 2 With a negative externality (a) ownership by …rm 1 yields a
greater level of a and a smaller level of e than obtains if either …rm 2 or
a consortium owns the asset; (b) under public ownership a is greater if the
…rms are separate, than if they are in a consortium.
Intuitively, if …rm 1 owns the asset it ignores the externality when choos-
ing a. In contrast, if …rm 2 is the owner, the bargain between the two …rms
causes …rm 1 to internalize partially the negative externality, and so to set
a at a lower level. Similarly, if the consortium owns the asset, it internalizes
15Under this interpretation we might expect that t0(a) = 0.
25the negative externality, restricting the level of a. If there is public owner-
ship, internalization of the externality only occurs when the …rms are in a
consortium.
A complication caused by the negative externality is that some of the
ownership structures may lead to a level of a or e that exceeds the respective
…rst-best level. Using (2) and (3), if the negative externality is su¢ciently
strong (c0(a) is su¢ciently positive in the relevant range) then a may exceed
its …rst-level under private ownership by either …rm1 or …rm 2 or under public
ownership when …rms are separated. However, for simplicity, we shall restrict
our attention to cases in which investment is less than the …rst-best level.
The discussion above then leads immediately to the following proposition.16
Proposition 3 Suppose there is a negative externality and that each own-
ership structure leads to under-investment in a. With public ownership, it
is optimal for the government to contract with separate …rms rather than a
consortium. With private ownership, any of the three ownership structures
may be optimal.
16The conditions for under-investment stated in the proposition are derived from com-
paring (2) and (3) with the …rst-order conditions for a and e under each ownership struc-
ture. These equations can also be used to give a full typology of the conditions under
which each type of ownership structure is optimal.
26Before turning to the intuition, we also compare private with public own-
ership. Comparison of the …rst-order conditions of the various cases yields
the following.
Proposition 4 Suppose there is a negative externality and that each own-
ership structure leads to under-investment in a. If v0(e) > µ
Fr0(e) and
u0(a) > µ
Ft0(a) then public ownership, with separate …rms, is optimal.
The results above show, amongst other things, the possibility that un-
bundling of the building and management functions constitutes the optimal
choice for a; i.e., it may not be optimal to induce the …rm who chooses the
level of investment in building quality to internalize the externality that its
choice produces on the level of management costs. This result can be under-
stood intuitively by noticing that none of the ownership structures allows full
internalization of the positive e¤ects of a on B(:) and Ri(:); and therefore un-
derinvestment may result in all cases. It follows that in order to attenuate the
underinvestment problem it may be optimal not to induce the internalization
of the negative externality on C(a;e). This can be achieved by separating
the building and the management functions. Clearly, the optimal ownership
structure for the choice of a does not necessarily coincide with that which is
preferable in terms of e: However, if, as stated in Proposition 4, the marginal
27e¤ects of a and e on social bene…t are relatively large compared to the e¤ects
on the market residual value of the asset, public ownership with separation
of …rms is optimal.
5 Conclusion and Policy Implications
In this paper we have studied the desirability of bundling the building and
management of facilities used for the provision of public services. We have
shown that when there is a positive externality across the stages of produc-
tion, bundling, with the …rms organized as a consortium, is always optimal
since it induces the internalization of the externality. This is consistent with
the motivation commonly given for PFI contracts, which views the integra-
tion between the di¤erent phases of the provision of a public service as a
device to promote investment.
We show, however, that, with a positive externality, ownership of the asset
by the consortium (the PFI model) is not necessarily optimal. Under some
conditions it is preferable for the government to own the asset. Furthermore,
if the externality is negative, the case for bundling is weakened: with private
ownership unbundled provision may then be preferable, while with public
28ownership unbundled provision is always preferable. In general, PFI is more
likely to be preferred (a) the more positive (or less negative) is the externality;
(b) the stronger the e¤ects that innovations in building and management have
on the residual market value of the facility; and (c) the weaker the e¤ect that
innovations have on the bene…t from provision of the public service.
The prison sector is often cited as an example where the integration
of building and management could have signi…cant e¤ects, and there is a
widespread bundling of functions in the prison sector in US (see Schneider,
2000). This is in line with our predictions, for the design of a prison can
have a great e¤ect on the cost of providing an adequate level of security
under which it operates; that is, there appears to be a strong positive ex-
ternality. Nonetheless, given that a prison may have little residual market
value, it does not necessarily follow that PFI, rather than public ownership
(with bundling) should be used. However, if we accept the argument made
by IPPR (2001) that the link between the design of schools and pupil edu-
cational outcomes has not been clearly shown, our analysis tends to support
the use of PFI in schools. The case is reinforced, at least for some schools,
if, as suggested in n.8, market residual value is signi…cant.
Our analysis has di¤erent implications when safety is a major issue, as, for
29example in the building of railway infrastructure. A high level of investment
at the building stage in the incorporation of new safety features may lead to
substantial social bene…ts. Also, this investment may have a negative exter-
nality, for it may be necessary to employ relatively expensive, skilled labour
to operate these safety features. We have seen that under these conditions
the case for PFI tends to be weak. When safety is not a major consideration
or can be easily monitored, for example, for roads and bridges, the case for
PFI is stronger.
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